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We report a wildlife epidemiologic investigation of mammals captured on or near properties in Utah, 
USA, where outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection occurred 
in farmed mink. Mink farms are relatively common 
in the United States, and most are small family farms. 
The US Department of Agriculture’s National Veteri-
nary Services Laboratories (Ames, IA, USA) confirmed 
SARS-CoV-2 in mink at 2 Utah farms on August 17, 
2020, after an investigation by the Utah Veterinary Di-
agnostic Laboratory and the Washington Animal Dis-
ease Diagnostic Laboratory (1). SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks 
have subsequently been confirmed at multiple farms in 
Utah, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Oregon. Although epi-
demiologic investigations are ongoing, infected workers 
are the probable source of the virus’s introduction (2).
The first reported SARS-CoV-2 infection in mink 
occurred in the Netherlands in April 2020 (3). Since 
then, dozens of farms in Europe have experienced 
outbreaks, and more than a million mink have been 
culled (2). Genetic analyses suggest spillover from hu-
man infections, and potential zoonotic transmission 
from mink to a worker is suspected (4). Clinical data 
from mink infected with SARS-CoV-2 indicate the 
species is highly susceptible and that infections can 
range from asymptomatic to peracute (5).
We captured free-roaming mammals during Au-
gust 22–30, 2020, by using Sherman (rodents) and Tom-
ahawk (mesocarnivores) traps placed outside of barns 
and barrier fences on outbreak premises and public 
lands within a 3.5-km buffer zone. Sample collection 
included oral, nasal (washes for mice), and rectal swab 
specimens; tissue specimens; and blood specimens. 
Swabs were placed in cryovials filled with 0.5 mL viral 
transport medium, and tissue specimens were placed 
in plastic sample bags or cryovials. Serum and swab 
samples were stored on ice, and tissue specimens were 
flash frozen on dry ice. Most samples were shipped 
within 24 hours. Swabs and serum samples were 
shipped to the National Veterinary Services Laborato-
ries, and tissue specimens were sent to the US Geologi-
cal Survey National Wildlife Health Center (Madison, 
WI, USA) for testing. All swabs and tissue specimens 
were tested for SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA by real-time 
reverse transcription PCR (rRT-PCR) targeting the N1 
and N2 genes, and serum samples were tested by virus 
neutralization assay (6). A positive rRT-PCR result was 
defined as detection of both N1 and N2.
We captured 102 mammals (78 rodents and 24 
mesocarnivores). Rodent captures consisted of 45 deer 
mice (Peromyscus maniculatus), 5 Peromyscus spp. mice, 
25 house mice (Mus musculus), and 3 rock squirrels 
(Otospermophilus variegatus). Mesocarnivore captures 
consisted of 11 presumed escaped American mink 
(Neovison vison), 2 presumed wild American mink, 5 
raccoons (Procyon lotor), and 6 striped skunks (Mephitis 
mephitis). Presumed escaped mink were closely associ-
ated with barns and designated as domestic escapees 
on the basis of location, behavior, and appearance. We 
identified wild mink by brown coat color and smaller 
size compared with farmed mink. All escaped mink 
and rodents, except for 4 deer mice and 1 rock squir-
rel, were caught on farm premises. All raccoons, the 2 
presumed wild mink, and all but 1 striped skunk were 
captured off-property but within the buffer zone.
Serum samples from the 11 mink escapees 
tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies by virus 
neutralization (Table). No other animal had a de-
tectable antibody response. Of the antibody-posi-
tive escaped mink, 3 also had high cycle threshold 
(Ct) detections by rRT-PCR of nasal swabs (range Ct 
35.89–38.95) and 1 lung tissue specimen (Ct 39.2 for 
N1). A rectal swab specimen from a house mouse 
had a high Ct detection by rRT-PCR but was nega-
tive for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies. N1 alone was 
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In August 2020, outbreaks of coronavirus disease were 
confirmed on mink farms in Utah, USA. We surveyed 
mammals captured on and around farms for evidence 
of infection or exposure. Free-ranging mink, presumed 
domestic escapees, exhibited high antibody titers, sug-
gesting a potential severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2 transmission pathway to native wildlife.
1These senior authors contributed equally to this article.
detected by rRT-PCR in 2 samples from deer mice 
(Ct 37.55 and 39.57).
Experimental studies of rodents suggest that Old 
World rodents (e.g., Mus) are resistant to SARS-CoV-2 
infection (7) and New World species (e.g., Peromyscus) 
are susceptible (A. Fagre, unpub. data, https://doi.
org/10.1101/2020.08.07.241810; B.D. Griffin, unpub. 
data, https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.07.25.221291). 
Given the demonstrated resistance of house mice to 
SARS-CoV-2 infection, the high-Ct rectal swab speci-
men, in absence of other positive results, suggests po-
tential ingestion and excretion of contaminated ma-
terial (e.g., food, carcasses) rather than infection. In 
contrast, the antibody responses of all escaped mink 
combined with high-Ct swab specimens for some ani-
mals suggests recent SARS-CoV-2 infections. These 
exposures in escaped mink are unsurprising given bi-
osecurity practices on some premises did not exclude 
incursions of escaped mink into barns.
Although we did not find evidence for SARS-CoV-2 
establishment in wildlife, the discovery of escaped mink 
with the opportunity to disperse and interact with sus-
ceptible wildlife, such as wild mink or deer mice, is 
concerning. In Utah, mink farms often overlap with 
designated critical mink habitats. Interactions or shared 
resources between escaped mink and wild mink or 
other wildlife species represent potential transmission 
pathways for spillover of SARS-CoV-2 into wildlife and 
could lead to health consequences or establishment of 
new reservoirs in susceptible wildlife (8; A. Fagre, un-
pub. data, https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.08.07.241810). 
Heightened biosecurity and best management practices 
would help prevent accidental releases of infected ani-
mals or spillover of SARS-CoV-2 from susceptible spe-
cies to native wildlife.
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Tuberculosis (TB), caused by the human pathogen Mycobacterium tuberculosis, is a recognized dis-
ease in human-managed and wild Asian elephants 
(Elephas maximus) and African elephants (Loxodonta 
africana) (1–3). Previous findings demonstrate the 
importance of human-elephant interfaces for trans-
mission. However, range countries for African and 
Asian elephants also have high burdens of bovine 
TB, caused by M. bovis. The World Organisation for 
Animal Health (OIE) records cases of bovine TB; in 
the 49 elephant range countries in Africa and Asia, 
only Namibia is declared free of M. bovis (4). There-
fore, the paucity of cases of M. bovis infection in 
elephants is unexpected. The lack of M. bovis cases 
in elephants may be caused by rare or sporadic ex-
posure, innate resistance of the species, or limited 
surveillance, especially in environments to which 
bovine TB is endemic.
Kruger National Park (KNP) in South Africa has 
recorded M. bovis infection in >20 wildlife species and 
is considered a bovine TB−endemic area. Although 
cases of M. bovis infection have been reported in other 
large herbivores, such as black rhinoceros (Diceros 
bicornis) and white rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum) 
(5,6), only 1 case of M. tuberculosis infection has been 
found in an elephant in KNP (3), despite hundreds of 
individual animals examined during 1967–1994 when 
elephants were harvested (7). After the discovery of 
an M. tuberculosis–infected adult bull elephant in 2016 
(3), opportunistic sampling of elephants was imple-
mented by park veterinarians. 
In May 2018, a young bull elephant (E1; estimat-
ed age 18–20 years) was fatally shot in the southern 
part of KNP. In addition, a young bull elephant (E2; 
estimated age 3 years) in KNP was euthanized in Oc-
tober 2019 after being found moribund. Postmortem 
examination of E1 revealed rare small, consolidated 
masses in the lung. Elephant 2 had several focal 
firm masses (1–2 cm2) scattered in the lung contain-
ing caseous material and some mineralization. We 
took representative samples from the peripheral 
(prescapular, inguinal, popliteal), head (parotid, 
retropharyngeal), thoracic (tracheobronchial), and 
abdominal (mesenteric) lymph nodes; lung lesions 
were also sampled. We froze samples at −20°C and 
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Mycobacterium bovis infection in wildlife species occurs 
worldwide. However, few cases of M. bovis infection in 
captive elephants have been reported. We describe 2 
incidental cases of bovine tuberculosis in free-ranging 
African elephants (Loxodonta africana) from a tuberculo-
sis-endemic national park in South Africa and the epide-
miologic implications of these infections.
